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Advances in the development of new paradigms as well as in neuroimaging techniques
nowadays enable us to make inferences about the level of consciousness patients with
disorders of consciousness (DOC) retain. They, moreover, allow to predict their probable
development. Today, we know that certain brain responses (e.g., event-related potentials
or oscillatory changes) to stimulation, circadian rhythmicity, the presence or absence of
sleep patterns as well as measures of resting state brain activity can serve the diagnostic
and prognostic evaluation process. Still, the paradigms we are using nowadays do not
allow to disentangle VS/UWS and minimally conscious state (MCS) patients with the
desired reliability and validity. Furthermore, even rather well-established methods have,
unfortunately, not found their way into clinical routine yet. We here review current literature
as well as recent findings from our group and discuss how neuroimaging methods (fMRI,
PET) and particularly electroencephalography (EEG) can be used to investigate cognition
in DOC or even to assess the degree of residual awareness. We, moreover, propose that
circadian rhythmicity and sleep in brain-injured patients are promising fields of research in
this context.
Keywords: disorders of consciousness (DOC), electroencephalography (EEG), resting state, sleep, circadian
rhythms
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have seen a rising number of patients who
survive even severe brain injuries due to advances in intensive
medical care. This process has been paralleled by a rising number
of patients in altered states of consciousness. Usually, patients
first enter a comatose state following severe brain injury, which
is an acute and transitory state that only lasts for a limited
amount of time. While some patients emerging from coma do
immediately regain full consciousness, others progress through
several states characterized by different levels of consciousness,
the so-called disorders of consciousness (DOC). The amount of
time that is spent in each of these states as well as the final
outcome strongly varies across patients and etiologies. Traumatic
incidents are usually related to a better prognosis with regard
to recovery of awareness than non-traumatic (e.g., anoxic or
ischemic damage) injuries (Working Party of the Royal College
of Physicians, 2003).
Commonly, consciousness is thought to require awareness of
the self and the environment (i.e., contents of consciousness)
as well as arousal at brain level. Both factors, awareness and
arousal, are thought to be necessary for a conscious experience to
emerge and neither of them is sufficient on its own (cf. Figure 1).
This conceptualization forms the basis for behavioral as well
as neuroscientific approaches to “assessing” consciousness in
patients with severe brain injuries. In healthy individuals, arousal
and awareness covary (with the exception of rapid eye movement
(REM) sleep) whereas DOC states are characterized by a
dissociation of the two: patients do recover periods of wakefulness
following coma whereas awareness remains absent (VS/UWS) or
impaired (MCS).
The question whether awareness or consciousness is an all-
or-none phenomenon or rather a continuum is a matter of
ongoing debate (see e.g., Overgaard et al., 2006; Overgaard
and Overgaard, 2010; Fingelkurts et al., 2014). Studies using
subjective introspection, that is studies asking participants to
indicate whether they consciously perceived a stimulus or not,
rather support the former view. However, neuroscientific studies
suggest that when looking at brain responses, awareness can in
fact be conceptualized as a continuum with different “levels of
awareness” that have been suggested to correspond to a hierarchy
of representational levels (Grill-Spector et al., 2000; Bar et al.,
2001; Kouider et al., 2010). This idea is well in line with the
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FIGURE 1 | Two factors contributing to consciousness: arousal and
awareness. In healthy sleep, arousal and awareness covary with the
exception of rapid-eye movement (REM) sleep while in brain death and
coma, arousal and awareness are not detectable. In the vegetative state (VS)
arousal is preserved in the absence of evidence for awareness. In the
minimally conscious state (MCS), both dimensions are present and
behavioral evidence of awareness is reproducible albeit inconsistent. In the
locked-in syndrome (LIS), both dimensions are more or less fully preserved
despite complete loss motor functions (adapted with permission from
Giacino et al. (2009)).
notion that this hierarchy is reflected by the extent of activation
in the neuronal network or “workspace” (Dehaene et al., 2006;
Del Cul et al., 2007). Importantly, these studies also propose
that there is a threshold, which has to be crossed for an
experience to become accessible by introspection (Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004a,b; Del Cul et al., 2007). Below this threshold,
an experience may be subliminal or preconscious. However,
although these experiences cannot be reported (verbally), we
should not conclude that they do not contribute to a conscious
experience, wherefore they may be considered “lower levels of
consciousness” (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kouider et al., 2010). As this
review focuses on the neuronal processes underlying awareness,
we hereafter understand both dimensions arousal and awareness
as a continuum.
The transition from coma to vegetative state (VS) is
accompanied by a recovery of autonomic functions and the
reemergence of arousal patterns or so called “sleep-wake cycles”.
Although patients do have periods of eye-opening, they are by
definition unaware of themselves and/or the environment and
show no purposeful interaction with their environment (Giacino
et al., 2009). Because arousal levels fluctuate and patients suffer
from perceptual, attentional and motor deficits, the detection of
signs of awareness is extremely challenging in this population.
The term “vegetative state” was originally chosen by Jennett
and Plum (1972) to indicate that these patients have preserved
vegetative nervous system functioning. To emphasize that these
patients should be fully regarded as human beings and not
“vegetating vegetables”, a new name for this neurological
condition was recently presented by Laureys et al. (2010): the
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS). This name, which
is rather neutral and descriptive, refers to a clinical syndrome,
which can be transitory or irreversible and includes patients who
are not able to show voluntary and targeted motor behavior
in the presence of eye-opening and sleep-wake cycles. In 2002,
a new group of DOC patients was introduced to denote a
group of patients who are neither continuously consciously
awake nor in VS/UWS (Giacino et al., 2002). In contrast to
VS/UWS, patients in the so-called minimally conscious state
(MCS) do display inconsistent, but reproducible and discernible
signs of awareness (i.e., command-following, yes-no responses
and intelligible verbal expression). By definition, these patients
are characterized by wakefulness and cyclic arousal as well as
awareness of the self and/or the environment. Patients emerging
from MCS can communicate reliably or use objects in a functional
way. To do justice to the high interindividual variability among
the group of MCS patients, it recently has been proposed to
further subcategorize this clinical population in MCS minus
(MCS−) and MCS plus (MCS+). Here, MCS− patients show e.g.,
sustained visual pursuit, localization of noxious stimulation or
affective behavior contingent to relevant stimuli, whereas MCS+
patients show inconsistent but discernible command–following
and thus evidence for “higher levels” of awareness (Bruno et al.,
2011).
In a nutshell, coma and VS/UWS are both considered
“unconscious” states as determined by conventional clinical
assessment. They are—by definition—unresponsive to
environmental stimulation (except for reflexive behavior) and fail
to show purposeful behavior. MCS patients on the other hand
show reproducible, but inconsistent signs of awareness of the self
or environment (Giacino et al., 2002).
Patients in the locked-in syndrome (LIS) form yet another
group that is behaviorally unresponsive to external stimulation.
These patients are also unable to speak or move extremities, but in
contrast to VS/UWS and MCS they are considered fully conscious
and have more or less completely preserved cognitive functions.
This condition often arises from neurological injuries or illnesses
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such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that selectively
disrupt motor pathways or reduce motor neuron functioning,
respectively. The LIS is not a disorder of consciousness in the
strictest sense (because awareness and arousal are retained),
but can be mistaken for VS/UWS because of the behavioral
similarities.
Until today, the gold standard for the clinical assessment
of DOC patients remains the use of standardized behavioral
methods such as the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale
and Jennett, 1974) or Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-
R; Kalmar and Giacino, 2005). The crux of these methods,
however, is, that they inherently rely on the patients’ ability
to demonstrate their awareness to the examiner. From the
absence of this ability it is concluded that a patient is not
conscious. As severely brain injured patients are often not
able to perform voluntary movements and motor responses
to command (e.g., because of quadriplegia), the more or
less exclusive use of these behavioral measures gives rise to
an unacceptably high rate of misdiagnoses of up to 43%
(Andrews et al., 1996; Schnakers et al., 2008b; Giacino et al.,
2009). During the last decade, researchers have, therefore, tried
to complement these classical methods with neuroscientific
paradigms. With these paradigms, they hoped to find brain-based
evidence of consciousness, i.e., evidence, which does circumvent
the drawbacks of behavioral methods. Still, until today these
new approaches have not been integrated in the conventional
clinical assessment of DOC patients. Yet, interestingly science
demonstrated that methods such as functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), allow—in some cases—to assess
the degree to which cerebral activity differs from healthy
participants more objectively or even allow estimating the extent
to which (higher) cognitive functions and even instruction-
following is preserved in the absence of overt behavior (Monti
et al., 2010). Bedside electroencephalography (EEG) is another
assessment tool, which could be introduced more easily into
clinical routine, is less stressful for patients and less costly.
Current experiments using event-related potentials (ERPs) or
time-frequency analyses as well as advanced methods such as EEG
complexity measures investigate indicators of cognitive processing
that may provide more precise information about the patient’s
level of consciousness. The influence of neuroscientific advances
becomes increasingly evident in the study of consciousness.
We will, therefore, review current literature as well as recent
findings from our group and discuss how classical neuroimaging
methods (fMRI, positron emission tomography (PET)) and
in particular EEG can shed light on preserved cognition
and consciousness in DOC patients. Furthermore, we will
review literature on sleep and circadian rhythmicity in severely
brain injured patients and suggest new intervention methods
to support rehabilitation as well as clinical assessment of
awareness.
RESTING-STATE ACTIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Investigation of resting-state brain activity in the absence of task
instructions has been used in the hope of finding correlates
of consciousness especially in those patients who lack the
cognitive abilities (e.g., keeping information in working memory,
comprehending language, being able to “execute” an action in
some way) necessary for putting task instructions into action. The
underlying idea is that indicators independent from the patient’s
ability to follow instructions can also be used to assess the level of
consciousness and make predictions about future developments.
The first studies of this kind mainly employed PET or fMRI.
They were able to show for instance that unresponsive patients
exhibit a global reduction of metabolism by 40–50% in VS/UWS
compared to the range of values in healthy individuals and
slightly higher, but comparable, in MCS (Laureys et al., 2004).
Permanent VS (PVS; the term denotes patients who have been
in VS for three or twelve months following non-traumatic or
traumatic brain injury, respectively; Multi-Society Task Force on
PVS, 1994), which is characterized by progressive trans-synaptic
and Wallerian neuronal degeneration, was associated with even
lower values of global brain metabolism (Laureys et al., 2004).
Another PET study revealed that VS/UWS patients show
impairments in a network encompassing midline and associative
regions (Laureys et al., 1999). Interestingly, the restoration
of connectivity in PVS patients within exactly those regions
(thalamic and associative regions) has been associated with
later recovery of consciousness (Laureys et al., 2000). A
study by Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011), moreover, suggests
the presence of two distinct neuronal systems involved in
mediating external (environmental) and internal (self-related)
awareness. More precisely, two different systems have been
identified: an extrinsic and an intrinsic system. The extrinsic
system includes the lateral parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortices and is mainly involved in mediating external awareness
(i.e., consciousness of external stimuli as well as awareness
of the environment) while the intrinsic network comprises
midline precuneus/posterior cingulate and mesiofrontal/anterior
cingulate cortices and mediates internal awareness (i.e., stimulus-
independent and self-related thoughts). Interestingly, other
studies did not only confirm the existence of these two networks,
but were also able to show that their integrity is related to varying
levels of consciousness (Thibaut et al., 2012). In particular,
VS/UWS patients showed dysfunctions in both the external and
the internal network, while MCS patients showed impairments
only in the internal network and thalamic regions when compared
to healthy subjects.
Following these findings, other imaging studies further
investigated resting-state networks with the aim of identifying
specific consciousness networks. In this context, the default mode
network (DMN), which includes the posterior cingulate and the
medial prefrontal cortex as well as the posterior parietal cortices,
gained particular attention. It has been linked to consciousness
and awareness (Boly et al., 2008) in many studies and in
particular to the processing of self-relevant information (for
meta analysis see Qin and Northoff, 2011). The DMN seems
to be functionally disconnected in brain death (Boly et al.,
2009) and connectivity within the network has been suggested
to decrease with the level of consciousness (Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2010). Other studies validate the idea that functional
connectivity between the areas constituting the DMN support
consciousness by showing that connectivity of exactly those
areas is drastically diminished in DOC (Cauda et al., 2009;
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Fernández-Espejo et al., 2012; Soddu et al., 2012). Another study
using methods based on the functional architectonics theory of
brain-mind functioning proposed by Fingelkurts et al. (2010),
supports this view finding functional connectivity (termed
“synchrony” in this theory) among neuronal modules including
the DMN to be markedly decreased or even absent in VS/UWS
and highest in conscious healthy individuals while patients in
MCS exhibited intermediate synchrony (Fingelkurts et al., 2012).
From a theoretical perspective, these findings are well in line with
the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004b) as well as
the information integration theory of consciousness (Tononi,
2004, 2008). The former theory proposes that the neural basis
of consciousness is a “sudden self-amplifying process leading to
a global brain-scale pattern of activity” that occurs once ignited,
i.e., when a certain threshold has been crossed (Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004b). The latter proposes that conscious experiences
crucially depend on the brain’s ability to integrate information,
which is reflected by functional connectivity among different
brain modules. Interestingly, regions constituting the DMN have
been found to be among the most well-connected regions in
the brain (Cole et al., 2010). Besides this, the amount of DMN
deactivation is inversely related to the probability of subsequent
awakening from coma and has been found to correlate with
the behaviorally assessed level of consciousness (Crone et al.,
2011).
Until now it is evident that imaging studies of resting
state data can provide insight into the level of consciousness
in DOC patients. However, PET requires a special scanner
only available in selected clinics as well as the injection of a
radioactive glucose analogue. Moreover, although fMRI scanners
are readily available nowadays, it is a costly method not all
patients can be tested with (exclusion criteria are e.g., a cardiac
pacemakers or metal pins and plates remaining in the patient’s
body after surgical treatment). Different research groups thus
investigated the suitability of the EEG for the exploration and
interpretation of resting state activity. In one study, Lehembre
et al. (2012) reordered 15 min of resting EEG in several DOC
patients. They were able to show that resting state EEG of
VS/UWS and MCS patients differs in the amount of delta and
alpha power. VS/UWS patients were found to have more delta
and less alpha power and, additionally, significantly decreased
connectivity in the theta and alpha bands compared to MCS
patients. A similar approach was used to determine whether
different frequency bands and spectral analyses of the EEG can
predict the behavioral outcome in DOC patients by Lechinger
et al. (2013). This study demonstrated that the alpha/theta ratio
as well as the resting EEG’s spectral peak was strongly correlated
with the behavioral CRS-R score in DOC patients. The bispectral
(BIS) index, a physiological index calculated from the weighted
sum of several electroencephalographic subparameters (high-
frequency (14–30 Hz) power, low-frequency synchronization
and the presence of periods of nearly of completely suppressed
EEG activity (i.e., isoelectric phases)) used to measure the
depth of anesthesia, has also been used to differentiate between
VS/UWS and MCS (Schnakers et al., 2008a). Additionally, the
BIS during early stages of recovery has been related to good
recovery one year later (Schnakers et al., 2005). Recently, also
connectivity measures have been applied to resting state EEG
data. Chennu et al. (2014) applied graph-theoretic measures
to high-density EEG data from DOC patients and healthy
controls. Looking at connectivity in canonical frequency bands,
they found differences between patient networks and control
participants. More precisely, patients’ alpha network modules
were spatially limited and long-distance connections commonly
observed in healthy networks were absent. Although these
characteristics were reversed in the theta and delta bands,
connectivity patterns were found to be robust across patients,
which could be deemed the result of reorganization processes.
Besides this, network metrics in the alpha band were found
to correlate with patients’ behavioral CRS-R scores. Another
class of measures that can be used to discriminate between
different entities in DOC is entropy measures. The common
idea behind EEG entropy measures is to describe the irregularity
and complexity of an EEG signal and in the case of e.g.,
symbolic transfer entropy (STE) even to determine the direction
of information flow. The underlying logic is that a regular EEG
signal, such as the signal recorded in slow wave sleep or deep
anesthesia, has a low level of entropy or complexity while the
one recorded from awake subjects has a higher entropy level.
Gosseries et al. (2011) were for example able to show that it is
possible to define an entropy cut-off value that can be used to
differentiate between unconscious states and MCS with a high
level of specificity even though not being valid for prognostic
purposes. Another interesting approach employs high-density
EEG in combination with transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to assess effective connectivity in DOC patients (Rosanova
et al., 2012). This approach can be used to calculate the so-
called perturbational complexity index (PCI; Casali et al., 2013),
which provides a numerical quantification of the brain’s ability to
support complex activity patterns. VS/UWS patients were found
to show a simple localized response to the TMS stimulation pulse,
which was reflected by low PCI values indicating low effective
connectivity. In MCS, TMS was able to trigger more complex
activations involving cortical areas distant from the site of
stimulation, which was mirrored by intermediate PCI values. This
suggests a more efficient interaction between different and distant
brain regions, which is linked to a higher level of consciousness.
Conscious wakefulness was associated with highest PCI values.
The TMS-EEG approach is remarkably well-researched in healthy
individuals across the consciousness continuum as well as in
DOC patients (Casali et al., 2013; Sarasso et al., 2014). It
moreover seems to be one of the very few measures that allow
differentiating between different levels of consciousness on an
individual level.
In summary, much effort has been undertaken in order to
find reliable and valid measures for the assessment of residual
resting state brain activity, which could serve as an indicator of
awareness in DOC patients. Despite these advances, we still lack a
clear and comprehensive understanding of human consciousness,
which would allow for a better differentiation of DOC states.
Moreover, most of the advances and developments of the last
20 years, have unfortunately not found their way into clinical
routine. In the future, the development of new EEG paradigms
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should allow for a better differentiation of VS/UWS and MCS
and enable a more reliable assessment and quantification of
consciousness along its continuum. Finally, these efforts should
flow into better rehabilitation guidelines in terms of appropriate
treatments individually attuned to the patient’s needs and
abilities. Moreover, developments in EEG methodology and
analysis should aim at developing more sensitive and effective
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) allowing MCS patients with
sufficient, but rather limited cognitive abilities to communicate
with the outside world.
STUDYING CONSCIOUSNESS USING PASSIVE STIMULATION
AND ACTIVE ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY PARADIGMS
Besides resting-state brain activity in the absence of stimulation
or task instructions, ERPs, that is, responses in the EEG evoked
by and time-locked to the presentation of a stimulus, have
been used to assess cognitive processing and predict outcome
in DOC patients. They depend to a varying degree on the
physical properties (e.g., pitch, volume or font size) of the
stimuli presented as well as top-down cognitive processes such
as selective attention (for a review see Herrmann and Knight,
2001). Early components of the ERP usually occur within the
first 100 ms after stimulus onset and are known to persist
even in unconscious states such as sleep or anesthesia. On the
contrary, later components such as the P300 as well as indexes
of verbal semantic processing (N400, late positive component
(LPC)) have been proposed to be more strongly related to
conscious information processing (Kotchoubey, 2005; Rohaut
et al., 2015).
Among the earliest components of the ERP, somatosensory
evoked potentials (SEPs) have been used to predict outcome
in DOC. It was found that for example bilateral absence of
SEPs elicited by median nerve stimulation within 8 days after
traumatic brain injury (TBI), is predictive of a negative outcome,
that is VS/UWS or death. Furthermore, it has been shown that
abnormalities of brainstem auditory evoked potentials (BAEPs)
or short-latency SEPs indicate a high probability of a negative
outcome. For example, Amantini and colleagues were able to
quantify the deterioration of brain functions in patients suffering
from severe brain injuries using SEPs and also demonstrated a
close relationship between SEPs and the evolution of the patients’
clinical state (Amantini et al., 1992). Besides these very early
components, also later ERP components have been used to
investigate cognitive processing and make predictions about
recovery from coma. The presence of the mismatch negativity
(MMN) for example has a strong positive prognostic value in
severely brain injured patients (Naccache et al., 2005). The MMN
is an ERP component, which can be elicited by the presentation
of a deviant stimulus (e.g., a higher pitched tone) in a sequence
of identical stimuli. In one study, Luauté et al. (2005) showed that
when an MMN could be detected during early stages of coma, the
estimated probability for a good functional outcome was around
70%. Also, the presence of a P300 has been linked to preserved
attentional as well as working memory capacities and hence is
frequently used in the assessment of DOC patients. The presence
of both early and late components (e.g., N100 and P300) in DOC
patients has also been linked to a good clinical outcome, although
longer and more variable latencies as compared to healthy
individuals suggest overall impaired information processing (e.g.,
Perrin et al., 2006). In a meta-analysis Daltrozzo et al. (2007)
compared the prognostic value of several ERP components.
They concluded that the presence of the N100, MMN and P300
components is a highly significant predictor of awakening with
the later components (i.e., MMN and P300) having significantly
more predictive power than the early N100. Another prognostic
factor, which has to be taken into account, is the etiology of brain
injury, where the probability of regaining awareness following
VS is higher in traumatic and post-operative etiologies than
in anoxia and metabolic pathologies (Working Party of the
Royal College of Physicians, 2003). This is probably due to the
former rather leading to localized injuries, which can often be
compensated for by other brain regions, while the latter usually
leads to widespread and more diffuse damage.
Besides a valid prognosis of a patient’s future development,
it is also important to discriminate between different levels of
consciousness and to further discern DOC patients on the basis
of their residual cognitive functions. This may have important
implications for rehabilitation efforts and sometimes even guide
decisions about life or death of a patient. To this end, Fischer et al.
(2010) investigated several ERP components in PVS and MCS
patients. In MCS patients somatosensory N20-P24 components
and the auditory N1 generally had a higher prevalence than in
PVS patients, whereas the presence of later components was not
statistically different between the two groups. In another study,
Perrin et al. (2006) reported that in all LIS and MCS and 60% of
the VS/UWS patients, the P300 was elicited by the passive (i.e.,
without further task instructions) auditory presentation of the
patient’s first name (SON; subject’s own name). The P300 latency
was significantly delayed in MCS and VS/UWS compared to LIS
patients and controls. The authors conclude that, especially for
salient stimuli such as the own first name, semantic processing is
at least partially preserved in non-communicative brain-damaged
patients, although this process seems to be delayed in MCS
and VS/UWS. The electrophysiological responses in this study
did, however, not allow for a discrimination between the two
groups of DOC patients. More recently, several studies also
investigated the diagnostic usefulness of indexes of semantic
processing in severely brain-injured patients (see e.g., Kotchoubey
et al., 2005; Schabus et al., 2011; Steppacher et al., 2013). Of
special interest in these studies was the N400, an ERP indexing
violations of semantic congruity (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980) in
word pair paradigms. Since the N400 has been shown to occur
even in the absence of consciousness (Sergent et al., 2005), a
study by Rohaut et al. (2015) also investigated a later ERP, the
late positive component (LPC, also termed P600), as an index
of conscious semantic processing. However, although several
studies found group differences between VS/UWS and MCS
patients, on a single-subject level, neither N400 nor LPC do
seem to be a valid index of the level of awareness for even in
conscious controls they often cannot be observed (Rohaut et al.,
2015).
Another approach to analyzing EEG data obtained during
passive auditory stimulation are entropy measures, which have
also been applied to resting state data (see section resting-state
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activity and consciousness). For example, King et al. (2013)
investigated the amount of information shared between brain
regions during passive auditory stimulation with tones as
quantified by weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI).
They were able to show that wSMI is related to the level of
consciousness in DOC being even able to differentiate MCS from
VS/UWS. In our own research, we were able to show that, in a
passive SON task, both permutation entropy (PE) as a measure
of local information processing as well as STE as a measure of
directional information transfer are suitable indicators for the
level of consciousness in DOC (Lechinger et al., 2014).
Recently, it has been argued that passive paradigms (i.e.,
paradigms investigating patients’ brain activity at rest or
during presentation of stimuli that do not require active
collaboration) are not useful for differentiating between MCS
and VS/UWS patients. This is because passive paradigms often
use stimuli (i.e., SON or odd stimuli in a sequence of identical
ones) that might well elicit automatic or even conditioned
responses (i.e., automatic semantic processing or a conditioned
orienting response to one’s own name). Thus, evoked brain
responses in passive paradigms do not allow for unambiguous
conclusions regarding the level of consciousness. To counteract
this methodological issue and to better disentangle automatic
or unconscious from voluntary or conscious brain activity,
it has been proposed to always combine passive and active tasks
(Schnakers et al., 2008b). In the latter task, patients are asked
to actively follow an instruction, e.g., to count how often a
stimulus is presented. If a patient successfully follows such an
instruction, different cognitive functions such as sustained and
selective attention and inhibition of interfering processes as well
as working memory need to be involved. This suggests that if
a patient is able to follow instructions, this is a very strong
indicator of preserved higher cognitive functioning and thus
conscious awareness. One way to assess instruction-following in
non-communicative patients is by means of electrophysiological
(EEG) responses. The P300 is for example very sensitive to
top-down selective attention with its amplitude varying as a
function of task instruction. Thus, it can be used to detect
instruction-following and hence conscious processing in DOC
patients. In a study by Schnakers et al. (2008b), patients in
altered states of consciousness were instructed to count the
SON or another target name or listen passively to the stimuli.
A higher P300 amplitude was found in response to the to
be counted target stimuli in MCS patients, but not in VS.
Interestingly, this pattern was even found in MCS patients
at the lower end of the MCS spectrum, i.e., patients only
showing low behavioral responses such as visual fixation and
pursuit. This suggests that the P300 in paradigms including
passive and active conditions may support the detection of
voluntary information processing in DOC. A more recent
study, however, advises a cautious interpretation of these findings
as volitional top-down attention can be impaired in patients
with covert cognition (Schnakers et al., 2014). This questions
the specificity of the task as it could lead to false negative
results.
Following results of studies of attention in healthy individuals,
other authors investigated two subcomponents of the P300,
namely P3a and P3b. While the frontal novelty P3a is thought
to index exogenous “bottom-up” attention, the posterior P3b is
thought to reflect endogenous “top-down” attentional processes
(e.g., Squires et al., 1975; Polich, 1988, 2007). Following this
idea, the investigation of the two subcomponents could allow
for a more exact evaluation of the patients’ cognitive abilities.
A recent study by Chennu et al. (2013), however, does not
fully support advantages of this differentiation. In a task, which
asked patients to count the number of times a specific word
(YES vs. NO) was presented, only 3/12 MCS and 1/9 VS
patients showed a P3a to the target word. Although the same
VS patient, who exhibited a P3a, also showed a P3b response
suggesting volitional control and hence challenging the VS
diagnosis, no single MCS patient exhibited a P3b. This was
despite some of the MCS patients even showing command-
following behavior on other tasks. In conclusion, these findings
rather question the usefulness of the distinction between P3a
and P3b for the assessment of cognitive processing in DOC
patients.
Fellinger et al. (2011) did not focus on ERPs, but investigated
the oscillatory activity by means of time-frequency analyses in
FIGURE 2 | Frontal theta event-related (de-)synchronization
(ERD/ERS) to counted own names. Time–frequency difference plots
[targets (SON)-passively listened other names] for the “count own
name”-condition. The dashed lines mark the presentation of the stimuli
(names) and the rectangles the area with the highest difference in the
theta-range. Note the increasing processing delay in theta power over
groups as well as the alpha ERD in controls only (adapted with
permission from Fellinger et al., 2011).
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the lower frequency range (i.e., theta and alpha oscillations,
which have been linked to attention and memory processes
(Klimesch, 1999)). This method is thought to be advantageous
for investigating brain processes in DOC patients as it does not
require brain responses to be strictly time-locked to an event (cf.
Figure 2).
Results indicate that MCS as well as VS/UWS patients
respond with an increase in theta event related synchronization
(ERS) when they are asked to focus and count the SON,
but not when they are asked to listen passively to the
stimuli. Thus, also time-frequency analyses allow for conclusions
regarding the patients’ ability to follow instructions. Höller
et al. (2011) moreover proposed the use of time-frequency
analyses in combination with a single-subject approach for
a more sensitive and reliable analysis of EEG responses in
patients. More generally, time-frequency analyses allow to
focus on distinct cognitive processes reflected by the behavior
of oscillations in different frequency bands and to thereby
refine the understanding of residual cognitive processing in
DOC.
Recent studies have demonstrated that emotionally and
self-relevant stimuli can better engage attentional resources
and consequently also induce stronger “higher-order” neuronal
responses in DOC patients (Jones et al., 1994; Di et al., 2007;
Di Stefano et al., 2012). We propose that this could be beneficial
for the detection of retained cognitive functioning in this patient
population. In a study from our group (del Giudice et al.,
2014a), we investigated whether the use of a familiar voice in
the traditional own name paradigm boosts the engagement of
attentional resources. Results from healthy controls indicate that
the passive presentation of self-relevant stimuli (SON and stimuli
uttered by familiar voices) induces stronger alpha ERD than
the presentation of non-self-relevant ones. This suggests that
self-relevant stimuli are able to attract attention and possibly
also trigger processes involved in recognizing and accessing self-
referential information. Furthermore, in the active condition
we were able to differentiate between targets and non-targets
on the basis of delta and theta ERS as well as alpha ERD
irrespective of the familiarity of the voice. Thus, also in
this version of the paradigm, time-frequency analyses allow
to reliably assess instruction-following. Preliminary analyses of
data from a VS patient revealed higher theta ERS for the
familiar voice as well as for the SON (Schabus et al., 2014).
These findings indicate that self-relevant information was able
to attract the patient’s attention–at least on a bottom-up
level. In the active condition, theta synchronization following
stimulus presentation was evident and even specific for target
stimuli.
In a similar study, we contrasted angry and neutral voices
in order to understand whether emotional prosody is also able
to engage attention and hence to facilitate top-down cognitive
processes (del Giudice et al., 2014b). Preliminary results from
a healthy sample indicated that in the passive condition, stronger
alpha ERD to angry than to neutral voice was evident irrespective
of the stimulus (SON vs. unfamiliar name) presented. This is
well in line with the results obtained using familiar voices. Again,
instruction-following gave rise to a differential EEG response
pattern. Altogether, results from the two studies support the
notion that adding emotional content to stimuli increases their
salience and thus benefits the detection of residual cognitive
functioning in DOC patients.
A recent study by Sitt et al. (2014) systematically compared
14 electroencephalography markers in a large cohort of DOC
patients. They found that theta and alpha band power as
well as measures of EEG complexity (permutation entropy
and Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity) and information
exchange (phase locking index and wSMI) constitute the
most reliable measures of the state of consciousness. The
combination of several of these markers allowed for an
even more accurate discrimination between consciousness
levels.
A different class of active EEG paradigms makes use of
the effects imagining motor actions has in the brain, which
can be visualized using EEG and fMRI. Owen et al. (2006)
were able to show in an fMRI study that even a patient
behaviorally diagnosed with VS/UWS was able to imagine to
“play tennis” or “navigate through a house” at will and that
this method can even be used by patients to communicate
with their environment in the fashion of yes/no answers (Monti
et al., 2010). In the EEG domain, it has similarly been shown
that some DOC patients are able to respond to motor imagery
instructions such as to imagine swimming or walking around
their home (Goldfine et al., 2011), to move hands and toes
(Cruse et al., 2011) or to grasp a cup (Lechinger et al., 2013)
with changes in EEG activity. Some of these findings have
already been investigated regarding the suitability for BCIs (e.g.,
Monti et al., 2010). In a study from our group (Körner et al.,
2014), we investigated EEG activation patterns in response to
watching or imagining a fist or tongue movement in healthy
individuals. Preliminary analyses revealed alpha and beta ERD
above left sensorimotor areas during fist movement observation
as well as weaker, yet observable alpha ERD during imagery.
Observing and imagining tongue movements led to bilateral
synchronization in the alpha band above the same areas. These
findings underline the potential suitability of EEG-based motor
imagery paradigms for bedside communication with patients. In
summary, we can conclude that ERPs and oscillatory patterns,
especially in combination with active paradigms, seem to be
promising tools for disentangling voluntary or conscious from
automatic or unconscious brain responses in DOC patients. They
are thus helpful in assessing preserved brain functioning and
in differentiating MCS and VS/UWS patients. These paradigms
do, however, have drawbacks that decrease the reliability and
validity of their results with regard to the assessment of
consciousness. Although active paradigms do provide a promising
approach for the detection of consciousness in brain-damaged
patients, there may be patients, who are not able to follow
instructions. This is because understanding and eventually
executing an instruction is extremely demanding with regard
to (higher) cognitive processes. Consequently, patients with
compromised cognitive abilities may have moments of wakeful
awareness, but are still not able to give “proof ” of their
awareness when tested with complex paradigms such as motor
imagery.
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CIRCADIAN RHYTHMICITY AND SLEEP IN DISORDERS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
CIRCADIAN RHYTHMICITY
Another approach to investigating the integrity of brain
functioning is to observe naturally occurring circadian rhythms.
There are circadian variations of e.g., the level of arousal,
temperature, blood pressure, hormone secretion, attention and
cognitive abilities. These variations are endogenously controlled
by a biological “Zeitgeber” located in the suprachiasmatic nucleus
of the hypothalamus (SCN). In case the SCN is destroyed,
circadian rhythmicity vanishes. In rats, for example, the total
amount of sleep time remains stable, but length and timing of
sleep episodes becomes instable (Ibuka and Kawamura, 1975). In
DOC patients, reinstatement of circadian rhythmicity (i.e., sleep-
wake cycles) is by definition characteristic for the emergence from
coma to VS/UWS. Although re-emergence of circadian rhythms
in DOC has generally been related to an improvement of the
patient’s state, studies suggest that some rhythms recover while
others do not. Studies have for example reported significant
circadian changes in body temperature as well as urinary excretion
of hormones and sodium in (P)VS/UWS patients, but no changes
in blood pressure or pulse rate were observed (Fukudome
et al., 1996; Pattoneri et al., 2005). A more recent study by
Bekinschtein et al. (2009) emphasizes that the etiology of the brain
injury has to be taken into account when investigating circadian
rhythms. They found that VS/UWS patients with TBI, but not
with anoxic-hypoxic origin exhibited circadian cycling of body
temperature.
Besides these parameters, also arousal levels vary across
the 24 hours of the day. A study by De Weer et al. (2011)
investigated circadian arousal rhythms monitoring changes in
the frequency and amplitude of hand movements by means
of videography and wrist-actigraphy. They found circadian
rhythmicity of arousal to be preserved in two MCS patients with
TBI, but not in an MCS patient who suffered from anoxic-
ischaemic brain damage and neither in a comatose patient. A
recent investigation by Cruse et al. (2013) recorded the motor
activity of a large sample of 55 DOC patients (18 VS/UWS
and 37 MCS) and found significant circadian changes of motor
behavior in 83% and 84% of VS/UWS and MCS patients,
respectively. Yet, the authors stated that VS/UWS patients
exhibited significantly less pronounced circadian rhythmicity
than MCS patients.
Generally, these findings demonstrate the need to further
investigate the presence of circadian rhythmicity in DOC patients,
not only to gain insight into brain functioning, but also to
validate the amount of circadian rhythmicity as an indicator of
the level of consciousness. Future studies should also investigate
changes in plasma hormone levels (e.g., melatonin, cortisol) and
temperature and also include the assessment of blood pressure
and heart-rate (variability) as indicators of circadian variations
in DOC. Moreover, interventions aiming at reinstating circadian
rhythmicity may be a promising tool to support assessment as well
as rehabilitation in DOC patients.
SLEEP
The most readily observable circadian rhythm, which all
mammals show, is the sleep-wake cycle. In DOC and here
especially for the purpose of differentiating VS/UWS from coma,
its presence is often assessed on the basis of prolonged periods
of eye opening and closing. However, conclusions regarding
circadian rhythmicity drawn exclusively from these behavioral
observations or actigraphy might be misleading and often little
reliable. We therefore propose to use polysomnography (PSG),
a method combining EEG as well as eye movement, muscle
activity and respiration measurements, for a reliable and valid
assessment of sleep in patients. PSG recorded over 12 or
24 hours provides insight into the rhythmicity of sleep/wake
patterns as well as sleep abnormalities. Moreover, PSG allows
for a more fine-grained analysis of different sleep stages,
and their characteristics, especially in clinical populations, and
thus provides additional measures that might be helpful in
FIGURE 3 | Sleep pattern from a healthy human. An exemplary hypnogram
depicting the different sleep stages over 8 h of nocturnal sleep. On the right
side of the figure, typical EEG graphoelements of every sleep stage have
been listed. In addition to certain EEG patterns, some of the sleep stages
also have characteristic EMG and EOG activity patterns. Early sleep is
predominated by N3, whereas later sleep is characterized by a relatively high
amount of R. One observes during wake—high muscle tone, high frequency
EEG (alpha-beta) and blinks; during light N1—eye rolling and vertex sharp
waves; during light N2—sleep spindles and k-complexes; during deep
N3—slow oscillations; and during R—rapid eye movements, PGO waves,
saw-tooth waves and muscle atonia with concurring rare muscle twitches.
Abbreviations: EEG, Electroencephalography; EMG, Electromyography; EOG,
Electrooculography; R, Rapid Eye Movement Sleep; REMs—Rapid Eye
Movements; PGO, Ponto-Geniculo-Occipital Waves.
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characterizing a patient’s state and predicting the outcome (Van
de Water et al., 2011).
While healthy human sleep has been well-described, sleep
complexity in DOC patients and its mere presence is still being
debated within the research community. In healthy individuals
with normal brain functioning, sleep consists of three non-REM
(N1, N2 and N3) sleep stages and REM (R) sleep. Each of
these stages is characterized by a typical PSG pattern and EEG
graphoelements, i.e., characteristic sleep-associated brain activity
micro-structures (cf. Figure 3).
Following severe brain injury, sleep-wake cycling is
often highly altered (Giubilei et al., 1995; Ouellet et al., 2004;
for review see Cologan et al., 2010). One important aspect that
must be kept in mind is that some of the sleep abnormalities
observed in critically ill patients have their origin not only
in brain damage. Another important factor is also the with
regard to circadian rhythmicity rather unfriendly environment
of intensive care units (ICUs), where medical procedures are
performed at all hours, noise levels are constantly high and
ambient light of high intensity is present even during the night
(Parthasarathy and Tobin, 2004; Seifman et al., 2014). Acute
illness, mechanical ventilation, discomfort, pain, exposure to
(sometimes constant) light and hence the loss of light as a
“Zeitgeber” as well as noise or nursing activities around the
clock might trigger awakenings, enhanced arousals and thus
sleep fragmentation (Cologan et al., 2010). De Weer et al.
(2011) were for example able to show that motor activity and
arousal in DOC patients correlated significantly with changes
in light irradiation suggesting that light on its own is able
to transiently increase patients’ arousal levels across all DOC
states. This is especially problematic when considering the
negative effects of sleep deprivation on, for example, activity
of the immune and endocrine systems, catabolic rate and
cell division (Bryant et al., 2004; Seifman et al., 2014), which
may also impair recovery from brain injury. As we will argue
below, stimulation with bright light during the day could
serve the re-establishment of circadian rhythms by boosting
arousal during the day and promoting sleep during the night.
This could hence support rehabilitation and recovery in these
patients.
Fine-grained analyses of sleep using PSG could also serve the
diagnostic and prognostic process. However, determining sleep
and distinguishing different sleep phases in DOC patients is most
challenging since they seldom show signs of sleep in EEG, EMG
and EOG, which are used for sleep scoring in healthy individuals.
Due to damages in specific brain areas and disruptions in
neuronal pathways, characteristic EEG graphoelements may differ
significantly in terms of frequency, length, or intensity, if they
occur at all. Additionally, recording PSG signals of acceptable
quality in DOC is extremely challenging because of artifacts
caused by e.g., sweating due to dysregulations of the vegetative
nervous system, spasms causing muscle artifacts, uncontrolled eye
movements or electrical artifacts caused by medical equipment.
Generally, these patients experience more frequent awakenings
and arousals than healthy individuals and have a decreased
amount of rapid eye movement (REM) as well as deep N3
NREM sleep as far as assessable (Ouellet et al., 2004). All
these reasons render the classical determination of sleep stages
according to the standard criteria (Iber, 2007) very challenging
or even impossible.
In line with this, the literature does not draw an entirely
conclusive pattern of the PSG graphoelements and their
association with the patient’s state of consciousness (see Table 1).
In one study, Cologan et al. (2013) observed slow oscillations
(although often below 75 µV) in all, REM only in three and
sleep spindles (although often below 10 Hz) in seven out of
ten VS/UWS patients. Additionally, they observed sleep spindles
(again, in some patients below 10 Hz), slow oscillations and REM
in all MCS and MCS+ patients. Landsness et al. (2011) found slow
oscillations and sleep spindles in all of six and REM in five of
six MCS patients, but neither sleep spindles nor slow oscillations
nor REM in any of the five VS/UWS patients examined. Finally,
de Biase et al. (2014) investigated sleep in 27 VS/UWS patients
and observed sleep spindles in fifteen (56%), REM sleep in four
(15%) and K-complexes in 22 (81%) of them. In all five MCS
patients they examined they found sleep spindles, REM and K-
complexes.
In summary, these findings, although not being entirely
conclusive, suggest that sleep in DOC patients has many facets.
Generally, the results support the notion of a relationship between
the presence of sleep and (partly) preserved brain functioning
as well as higher levels of awareness. On the other hand, sleep
does also have beneficial effects on brain plasticity and therefore
supports the recovery process. Regarding sleep in LIS patients,
the literature is especially scarce. Besides almost normal sleep
patterns in some patients, there are also LIS patients who do
exhibit hyposomnia, disorganized NREM sleep or complete REM
absence (Cummings and Greenberg, 1977). This rather broad
spectrum most likely arises from differences in the exact location
and extent of brain lesions underlying the patient’s state. More
specifically, it seems that the more widespread the pontine lesion,
which is one of the possible causes of LIS, the more pronounced
the sleep disturbances, especially regarding REM. Severity of
sleep disturbances also increases in case of bilateral or dorsal
extensions of pontine lesions, when the pontine tegmentum is
involved and especially if the serotonin-releasing brainstem raphe
nuclei are affected (for review see: Cologan et al., 2010).
Still, assessment of sleep and its characteristics seems to be
a promising approach with regard to diagnosis and prognosis.
A more systematic description of PSG patterns in DOC could
furthermore benefit the establishment of DOC-specific sleep
scoring criteria, which could help circumventing the limitations
described above. However, even without such criteria, the
mere presence of certain sleep elements and sleep stages
resembling healthy sleep holds valuable information. It can
allow for inferences regarding the preservation of specific brain
areas and consequently brain integrity. It has, for example,
been suggested that the presence of slow oscillations during
sleep suggests intact functioning of certain brainstem nuclei
and thalamo-cortical loops (Dang-Vu et al., 2008) and that
the presence of REM may indicate integrity and preserved
functioning of the brainstem pontine tegmentum (for review see:
Cologan et al., 2010). Furthermore, the intensity or the amount
of sleep spindles observed in the EEG of DOC patients is an
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Table 1 | EEG graphoelements and the patients’ state of consciousness.
Cologan et al. (2013) Landsness et al. (2011) de Biase et al. (2014)
VS/UWS MCS MCS+ VS/UWS MCS VS/UWS MCS
Slow-Oscillations 10/10 7/7 3/3 0/5 6/6 — —
Spindles 7/10 7/7 3/3 0/5 6/6 15/27 5/5
REM 3/10 7/7 3/3 0/5 5/6 4/27 5/5
K-Complexes — — — — — 22/27 5/5
Overview of results reported in the literature.
indicator of intact and efficiently connected thalamo-cortical
networks (for review see: Cologan et al., 2010). The authors even
suggested that the shape of slow oscillations or the frequency of
sleep spindles in DOC patients might reflect the preservation
of the thalamo-cortical system as a whole and might thus be
informative regarding the state of consciousness (Cologan
et al., 2013). Also signal complexity during sleep seems to hold
information about brain integrity. Valente et al. (2002) classified
DOC patients’ sleep EEG patterns into five categories based on
signal complexity and related these to the eventual outcome.
The categories were defined as follows with higher numbers
denoting higher signal complexity: (i) monophasic; (ii) cycling
alternating pattern; (iii) rudimentary sleep; (iv) NREM sleep; and
(v) REM sleep. Afterwards, the authors related these categories to
the outcomes of 24 patients: five of the six patients who belonged
to the fifth and most complex category showed good recovery;
three patients from the fourth category improved, but were still
severely disabled. Patients from the three least complex categories
(seven patients) had an unfavorable outcome. They remained in
coma, did not emerge from VS/UWS, or died.
The literature reviewed here shows that the results do not
allow drawing a clear picture regarding sleep in DOC so far,
neither do they allow distinguishing different DOC states taking
into account the presence or absence of sleep stages and/or sleep
elements. This probably results from the heterogeneity of the
group of DOC (VS/UWS and MCS) patients: etiology (traumatic
vs. non-traumatic), location and extent of brain lesions, time
since brain injury, received medication and rehabilitation granted
to a patient. Last but not least, this probably is—at least partly—
also due to problems regarding the applicability of the available
scoring criteria to sleep in DOC patients. However, it seems
that more complex sleep patterns are related to preserved brain
functioning and therefore also to a better diagnosis and prognosis,
wherefore we believe it is worth investigating sleep in DOC in
more detail.
INTERVENTIONS—TRANSLATION OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE INTO
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS
Taking into account the literature reviewed so far, we propose that
bright light stimulation might be a promising tool to be utilized
in DOC states. Bright light therapy could promote arousal,
especially during assessment of potentially retained cognitive
abilities. Furthermore, it may also help re-establish circadian
rhythmicity and sleep in DOC.
It is well known that, besides synchronizing the circadian
clock and regulating melatonin secretion (Thapan et al., 2001),
light has a modulatory effect on arousal and activity in
cerebral attention networks (Cajochen et al., 2000). On a
cellular level, this regulatory mechanism involves melanopsin-
expressing retinal ganglion cells (mRGCs), so-called non-image
forming photoreceptors in the mammalian retina, which detect
changes in environmental light irradiance. Exposure to bright
light has previously been shown to promote alertness in healthy
participants (Cajochen et al., 2008). Moreover, it has been found
to improve concentration and working memory (Kretschmer
et al., 2012) as well as general cognitive functioning (Royer et al.,
2012) in elderly individuals. De Weer et al. (2011) suggested in
a recent study that light therapy may also transiently promote
arousal in all states of unconsciousness. In summary, we believe
that bright light therapy could be a low-cost and non-invasive
therapeutic approach to boost arousal and activate remaining
cognitive resources in DOC patients that could, moreover, be
integrated easily into clinical routine. It could, additionally,
also increase the reliability of clinical assessments. For this
purpose, bright light stimulation should take place right before
the assessment of consciousness levels with behavioral scales or
neuroscientific paradigms.
Besides the effects on cognition, in patients suffering from
dementia, bright light therapy has been shown to have a positive
effect on sleep (Campbell et al., 1995; Ancoli-Israel et al., 2003).
This could be the result of the re-establishment of circadian
rhythmicity, which is often impaired in dementia (Volicer et al.,
2001), by attuning melatonin excretion. We propose that also
DOC patients could benefit from bright light therapy during
the day in combination with low light levels during the night.
This will, according to our reasoning, benefit the restoration of
circadian rhythmicity and normalize sleep, both of which have
been shown to be related to a positive outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
During the last years, an increasing amount of studies have
investigated cognition in DOC patients from various perspectives
and tried to find traces of consciousness. Patients who emerge
from coma following severe brain injury and who do present
with periods of eye-opening are considered to be in VS/UWS.
By definition, they are, however, not aware of themselves and/or
their environment. When patients exhibit more complex behavior
such as visual pursuit or instruction-following, they are thought
to be minimally conscious and to have regained some level of
awareness. The challenge clinicians as well as scientists, however,
face is how awareness can be detected and in a next step
quantified. Despite considerable progress in this field, until now,
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researchers have not been able to develop a method or test battery
that allows for reliable and unambiguous conclusions regarding
the level of consciousness a patient retains.
It is increasingly accepted, that certain brain responses, the
presence of circadian rhythmicity or of certain sleep elements as
well as functional resting state activity can serve the diagnostic
and prognostic evaluation process as indicators of retained brain
functioning or even consciousness. For example, the absence of
the earliest ERP components (i.e., somatosensory or auditory
evoked potentials) has been associated with a negative outcome,
whereas the presence of later components (e.g., MMN or P300)
suggests preserved cognitive functioning and predicts good
outcome. Active paradigms, in which patients are instructed to
follow commands (e.g., count the number of presentations of
a stimulus or imagine a motor action) allow for conclusions
about retained higher cognitive functions (e.g., working memory,
sustained and selective attention). They are, thus, useful for the
detection of conscious awareness in behaviorally unresponsive
patients and especially in patients at the upper end of the DOC
continuum. Resting-state activation and connectivity within the
DMN have been suggested to be related to two different kinds
of awareness: external (regarding the environment) and internal
(including reflections about oneself) awareness. It has, moreover,
been shown that the EEG spectrum at rest, entropy-based
measures of signal complexity as well as the combination of EEG
and TMS may allow for a refined diagnosis and serve as predictors
of outcome. Additionally, we propose that circadian rhythmicity
and sleep in DOC should be investigated more thoroughly as they
could allow differentiating between VS/UWS and MCS patients
as well as inform about the integrity of certain brain areas. Last
but not least, interventions aiming at re-establishing circadian
rhythmicity and sleep in DOC patients such as bright light
stimulation may depict new methods supporting rehabilitation.
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